

*Possible Reasons Why Khrushchev was Compelled
to Reveal U-2 Plane Story at this Time*

I. The following is a list of the factors cited by Ambassador Thompson, with our brief comments attached to each.

A. Genuine anger over what the Soviets consider repeated provocative violations of their territory. (We agree, but note that K managed to restrain his anger until he had the goods. Then he made a deliberate decision to exploit the incident before the Summit.)

B. A demand for a strong stand by the Soviet military, who are unhappy over demobilization. (We tend to discount, or to accept this would be to believe K much weaker in domestic politics than we have estimated.

However, we cannot prove Thompson wrong. It is true that (1) military clearly most unhappy; (2) party making ^{no}ses about commanders who do not follow party decisions; (3) much talk about demobilization but not much action; (4) changes in high command. Therefore, it is possible that there has been some footdragging, in which case plane incident would give military strong card to play.)

State Dept. review completed

DOCUMENT NO. _____
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EXTENDED REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH. REF. 70-2

C. A desire to put the President on the defensive at the Summit and weaken our position in the Western alliance. (We believe this to be K's dominant^{or} motive. It is consistent with his tactics in the past; he is not a man to forego exploiting any chink that may show in his opponent's armor and we note that he has been careful not to say anything which might block having the summit.)

D. Khrushchev's possible discouragement on Summit prospects and his consequent desire to prepare the public for failure. (We doubt that K's personal expectations from the Summit have been so high. On the ^{(hand,} other_^ it is quite possible that the Soviet public may have been over-optimistic.)

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E. Khrushchev's belief that a strong stand may be required because of increased opposition to his policies within the USSR and the Bloc. (If the plenum last week is any evidence, he is not under any great pressure in the USSR. However, see my notes on B, above.) He is under strong pressure from China, and lesser pressure from Eastern Europe. But if he became convinced that the Chinese had gone too far in their challenge to him, and/or that domestic enemies were hitting him in a vulnerable point, his personal commitment to a detente might cause these pressures to backfire - i.e., he might feel greater pressure to seek detente rather than to oppose it.)

II. Thompson concludes that internal problems will limit Khrushchev's freedom of actions at the summit, but that, while working for the victory of Communism, he genuinely desires relaxation of tensions and diminishing the danger of war. (We agree, but feel this statement plays down too much the force and dynamism of his approach to international problems. It implies that he would avoid throwing international tantrums, yet plane incident makes clear that pressure element ⁿis his policy just as strong as detente.)

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